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by Neil C. Krey
Principal Instructional System Designer
Hughes Training, Inc.
Presented at the
1997 Flight Crew Training Conference
Montreal, Quebec
22 October 1997
In 1994, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted a study that found 80 percent of the 37 accidents examined occurred while the first officer was functioning in the pilot-not-flying (PNF) role. The study also found that over half of the first officers involved had less than one year experience.
A study just released by University of Central Florida suggests that first officer PNF difficulties are not typically related to technical knowledge or skill problems. Rather, they stem from the limited ability of the junior first officer to accurately assess a situation's risk and time available, and limited ability to manage workload effectively. Less frequently, low levels of assertive behavior while monitoring flight activities are a contributing factor.
This paper explores training techniques designed to enhance junior first officer PNF performance. These techniques suggest modifications to the Crew Resource Management (CRM) and Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) programs currently in place at most airlines, focusing on the skills required by junior first officers to address the identified problems. Additionally, consideration is given to supporting Initial Operating Experience (IOE) and line activities.
As the aviation industry enters another growth cycle, and as two-crew aircraft become dominant in the world fleet, new first officers are entering airline fleets worldwide who have less experience than in the past. These inexperienced pilots are generally satisfactory in their technical ability with regard to pilot-flying (PF) duties, but often have not had training or experience performing as PNF. There have been two studies accomplished in the last few years that provide valuable insight into the dynamics on flight decks where junior first officers serve. These studies suggest there are performance requirements for first officers which are not currently addressed by current training programs.
In January 1994, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a study of 37 accidents which occurred between 1978 and 1990. Among the causal factors identified in their analysis, the board noted several related to crew composition and experience.
In their analysis, NTSB also noted that the error type observed most often for captains while acting as PF was the tactical decision error. Tactical decision errors include improper decision making, failure to change course of action in response to signals to do so, and failing to heed warnings or alerts that suggest a change in course of action. NTSB attributed these errors to the additional cognitive workload of aircraft control. The result was increased time to recognize and respond to changing situations. Of the fifty one tactical decision errors noted, twenty eight were not challenged by the PNF first officer.
31 percent of the accidents studied involved monitoring/challenging failures by the PNF first officer. Monitoring/challenging errors include failing to monitor and /or challenge faulty action or inaction by another crew member. NTSB noted that "In monitoring and challenging a captain's tactical decision error, a first officer may have difficulty both in deciding that the captain has made a faulty decision, and in choosing the correct time to question the decision." They also raised concerns about the level of assertiveness on the part of first officers.
In May 1997, the University of Central Florida delivered a report titled "Identifying Critical Training Needs for Junior First Officers" to the U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division, and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. This study involved pilot interviews and a review of incident reports from NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). It found that in over half of the incidents involving junior first officers, the major problem was the first officer's failure to monitor and challenge the captain. Only one-quarter of the reports cited technical or procedural errors on the part of the junior first officer.
Further analysis indicated that in one-third of the incidents involving failure to monitor and challenge, junior first officers' errors was attributed to inability to plan their own workload. In another third, the first officers identified that a problem existed, but did not initiate action - either because they believed the problem did not require corrective action, or did not require action at that time. In the remaining third, they identified the problem, saw the need for action, but did not act for fear of the potential negative consequences.
These studies suggest that today's training programs are preparing junior first officers for the pilot-flying role, but are not adequately preparing them for their role as pilot-not-flying. Indeed, the majority of the failures described were not the result of deficiencies in technical knowledge and skill.
An informal review of typical training curricula reveals the emphasis in most initial qualification programs is on developing the pilot's technical ability to operate the aircraft. The good news is that our existing training programs are doing a good job in this regard. Similarly, while improving crewmember assertiveness was an early focus of CRM training, these studies suggest that assertiveness is not the primary cause of monitoring/ challenging failures. Again, it can be argued that our CRM programs are serving us well.
The primary lesson from these studies is that junior first officers often do not have the ability to accurately assess both the risk and time available for action in a given situation. This is aggravated by limited skills in managing workload effectively. Each of these factors can be addressed using currently available training techniques within the structure of existing training programs. Both captains and first officers will need to receive elements of this training to optimize crew performance.
Given the unique training needs of the junior first officer, it is suggested that CRM and LOFT programs may not be a one-size-fits-all proposition. Preparing a first officer to effectively perform the duties of pilot-not-flying may require a systematic approach during qualification and during the first year of line operations.
Specifically, new first officers require training in monitoring and challenging within the context of the CRM and LOFT programs. Initial Operating Experience (IOE) programs should ensure that the newly qualified first officer is given ample opportunity to perform the duties of a PNF. Finally, captains can enhance the first officer's early development through the conduct of post-flight debriefings which focus on inflight performance.
Most airlines currently provide crew resource management training as part of initial training for newly hired first officers. Those training under the FAA's Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) have CRM integrated into their programs. Often, the CRM training provided to new hires has the same content as that given to the rest of the pilot population. To effectively address the above issues -- accurate risk assessment, time assessment, and effective workload management -- discreet training objectives must be included in the CRM training provided to junior first officers.
As with most successful CRM training, such training is most likely to be successful if it combines captains with the junior first officers. This mix has the added benefit of allowing captains better appreciate how they can aid the development of new first officers.
During training development, learning objectives for this initial CRM program would be tailored to the CRM principles applicable to PNF, as well as PF, duties. These would include:
The training would be conducted using case studies, discussion, and exercises to help the new first officer recognize the issues and skills involved. Also covered would be captain awareness of lower levels of situation awareness and assertiveness on the part of junior first officers, and the impact this will have on the captain's own workload.
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) is a valuable follow-on to the groundwork created in the CRM training program. LOFT allows the junior first officer to practice the skills and techniques presented, and receive feedback on the results of their efforts. To successfully accomplish these objectives, event sets need to be included in the LOFT scenario which create PNF opportunities for the first officer in managing workload, monitoring PF performance, and detecting errors. Instructors will note first officer challenging performance. In some cases, the captain may be briefed separately to induce errors into the flight. The most critical element in the LOFT for junior first officers will be a focused debriefing. This allows reflection on PNF performance during the flight and discussion of avenues for additional improvements.
A newly qualified first officer has a valuable opportunity to reinforce the lessons gained in the CRM and LOFT programs once they move out onto the line. It is important to ensure that the first officers be given ample opportunity to perform the duties of a PNF during the Initial Operating Experience (IOE) phase of qualification so that PNF performance can be observed and enhanced.
The final element of the program to enhance junior first officer PNF performance is to introduce the use of debriefing with captains following line flights. Such debriefings provide feedback that serves to reinforce desired behaviors and correct undesirable ones as the first officer continues professional development. Successful conduct of these debriefing may require training for captains as well as significant changes to some airline cultures. While former military pilots are accustomed to post-flight debriefs, few airline cultures have embraced this valuable professional growth tool.
As air carriers around the world continue to hire pilots, both from ab initio sources and diminishing pools of more experienced candidates, ensuring a balance between the new hire's pilot flying and pilot not flying duties becomes increasingly important. The studies cited above indicate that junior first officers require training in several unique topics to perform effectively in both roles on the flight deck. These topics can be effectively addressed in the CRM and LOFT portions of existing training programs. Additional support can be provided through enhancements to IOE and incorporation of post-flight debriefings in line operations.
Jentsch, F., Martin, L., & Bowers, C. 1997. Identifying critical training needs for junior first officers. (Technical report submitted to the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division and the Office of the Chief Advisor for Human Factors at the Federal Aviation Administration). Orlando, FL: University of Central Florida.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 1994. Safety study: A review of flightcrew-involved, major accidents of U.S. air carriers, 1978 through 1990 (NTSB/SS-94/01). Washington, D.C.: National Technical Information Service.